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Abstract
This paper analyzes the reoccurring rhetoric of the Republican Party of minimal
government spending and its relation to budget allocations, as a percent of the total US budget,
for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Since the Civil war veterans have been a constant
constituency of the Republican Party, and as a result have received favorable legislation and
benefits. However, the idea of limited spending conflicts with the support of this constituency
group in regards to continued yearly budget growth for the VA. Analyzing a set of time series
data, the paper seeks to determine which ideology wins out; support for veterans through
increased budget growth, or limiting budget spending even at the cost of VA earmarks.
Additionally, the impact of veterans in Congress, a legislative group that has been diminishing
since it peek in the 1970’s, on the allocation of budgetary earmarks for the VA. Scatter plots to
determine bivariate relationships of increased Republican members in Congress, as well as
majority control in each chamber and again as a whole, are utilized to determine a linear
relationship on the budget for the VA; the same method is also used in regards to the percent of
veterans in each chamber. Finally, a multivariate model is created to determine the effects of
these variables on the yearly VA budget. Findings concluded that Republican ideology for
limited national spending wins out in the end; an increase in Republicans in Congress results in
less funding, as a percent of the budget, and veterans have little to no impact on the outcome of
VA budget growth. While these results may be surprising, it’s important to note that the paper
only seeks to determine the relationship with the VA, and by no means establishes if Republicans
are or are not still the most advantageous party for veterans and their interests.
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The United States faces a financial struggle moving into the future. A rapidly increasing
national deficit has the country in a 19 trillion dollar debt that sees little hope of decreasing any
time soon; especially since federal spending in the 20th century has grown exponentially and the
budget has become a perpetual battle ground for politicians to wage campaigns over. A fight for
a piece of the budget by a growing number of interest groups across the nation has led to
considerable disagreement about where that money should go. One such group, American
veterans, have made significant attempts to lobby for their ‘fair share’ of government funding
since the Civil War era. This group often uses their prior patriotic service to legitimize their
claims. Historically, the group has fared well, and they have been an effective lobbying group
(Holcombe 1999). In recent times, efforts by veterans have grown beyond benefits, but toward
equality in the military itself. Megan MacKenzie (2012), examines the growing lobbying efforts
by military member and veterans to include women in more combat rolls; and today’s military
has seen the culmination of their efforts as women are beginning to be allowed in such rolls.
Symbolized in American culture, veterans are seen as the epitome of heroism and patriotism and
are backed by some of the most predominant lobbying groups such as the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, The American Legion, American Veterans, along with many others.
According to the United States Census Bureau, there are 18.8 million military veterans in
the US population.1 If you combine these figures with the number of current active duty and
reserve personnel, roughly 7.3 percent of all living Americans have served in the military at
some point in their lives (Chalabi 2015). Because this portion of the people represents so few of
the nation as a whole, they are considered a minority. These veterans, the men and women who
have taken up the call to fight for the freedoms enjoyed by the United States and are arguably

1

https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2016/cb16-ff21.html
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owed a debt for their service to the country, and this is reflected in the rhetoric of both the people
and the politicians themselves. President Theodore Roosevelt once said in an address to veterans
in Springfield, Illinois, “A man who is good enough to shed his blood for his country is good
enough to be given a square deal afterwards” (Roosevelt 1903, 1).
Since the Civil War era, veterans have been more likely to give their political support to
the Republican Party, and in return have received considerable funding, benefits, and legislation
to support their cause. Modern day Republicans are still known to be strong allies of veterans
and many have backed legislation in favor of veteran support services. However, today’s
Republicans are also forced to acknowledge the reality of deficit spending and a considerably
larger national government since the 1930s; these issues being the focal point of Republican
standards, the decrease in spending and the limitation of ‘big government.’ This conundrum,
where members of Congress may be torn between an increase in spending for their constituents,
in this case veterans, and continued budget deficits, leads one to wonder if Republicans continue
to hold up their end of the bargain, and continue to support American veterans in the way they
have for decades. Complicating matters further, the representation of veterans in Congress has
decreased substantially in the past fifty years. The number of veteran representatives in the US
Congress has decreased from its peak of 70 percent in the early 1970’s, to less than 20 percent in
the modern day Congress (Bianco 2005).
Given all of this, research into the question of partisanship and support for veteran
benefits, seems an issue that warrants further investigation. Does the Republican Party, which
has maintained support for legislation that benefits veterans since the Civil War still remain the
party most likely to support veterans? Has their support been maintained, or have budget deficits
or other considerations led the Republican Party to reduce their efforts on behalf of veterans? As
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noted, the representation of veterans in Congress has decreased, does this have an effect on the
outcome of veteran’s benefits? This paper seeks to addresses two central questions: does the
partisanship of the US Congress affect funding for the Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA)
programs, and secondly, does the decrease in veteran representation within Congress have an
effect on funding for the VA? The aim is to determine whether or not the popular belief that
Republicans are the primary supporters of VA funding is accurate, and to determine whether the
number of veteran legislators in Congress has a positive influence on decisions to increase
spending. It’s important to note that this paper seeks to only examine budgetary support for the
VA by Republicans and veterans, and excludes investigation into other legislation and benefits
by Republican and veteran support.

Legislative Explanations for Budgetary Decisions and Veteran Influence
A large volume of research indicates that budget issues are a larger and more complex
issue than simply partisanship (Hanson 2014; Keiser, Miller 2010; Nupia 2013). Beyond the
partisan loyalties and ideological leanings, several other factor play into the decisions of
legislators and the influence of how the budget is established. Examples include: pork barrel
legislation, incrementalism, and the effects of legislators that identify as a member of a given
community, such as veterans. The importance of the nation’s fiscal well-being cannot be
overstated. As Allen Schick (1975) explains, the budget is a highly contested issue. With tens of
billions of dollars at stake every year, with vital interests and policies hinging on the outcomes,
the budget has vast potential for conflict among politicians. The only potential for the budget to
become a routine affair would depend on the United States having an overabundance of
resources sufficient enough to satisfy all major claims, something not likely to occur anytime
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soon. Thus legislators may need to consider several different variables in order to make a
decision on how they should vote.

Legislative Pork
As previously mentioned, there are several complex issues that influence the budget,
determining who gets what and when, and how the legislator should vote on the matter. One such
observed issue in the idea of politicians needing to bring home the “pork”, or pork barrel
legislation. Oskar Nupia (2013) explains that pork barrel legislation is the result of the governing
party, having the majority support of its legislators, promotes a particular ideological policy, but
still requires additional votes in order to get it through the legislature. As a result it makes
available the possibility of vote trading. A more simple way of understanding pork barrel
legislation is the idea of quid pro quo, the promise of future incentives for voting in favor of the
currently proposed legislation. In testing the true distribution of legislative pork, a study found
that in recent years, since the 104th congress, it is the majority party that receives the greatest
amount of pork, rather than the minority party as an “award” for being a district in the majority
party (Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, & Sigelman 2002). In other words, the recent increase in
polarization, which will be discussed later on, may have led to a need for incentives inside the
majority party which may be fraying. Furthermore, helping the legislators in the same majority
party may lead to a public view of better productivity in that party’s districts, in essence making
the party look better. This can be reflected toward the states as well; according to Megan
Hammons (2016) seven of the ten best states for retired veterans, based on their combined scores
for economic environment, quality of life, and health care, are red states which match the
national government’s current majority party, though it’s important to note some of these
benefits may be directly related to city or state officials, federal funding for these initiatives are
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present. However, this reflects the issue ownership idea of Republicans being the party that is
best for additional, positive veteran legislation.

Incrementalism on Budgetary Growth
Every year Congress must vote on a new national budget, determining where to make
cost cuts or add addition funding. Determining how to do so, and how much should be
implemented can being a yearly complex issue. As a result legislators may use shortcuts to make
decisions of certain budget allocations that are not particularly contentious. When it comes to the
continued funding and allocation of recourses for federal departments, it may be the case that
incrementalism is the greatest explanatory theory. As departments continue to function, and
prices of goods continue to rise with the growth of the economy, it may simply be that each year
a small increase in budget to these departments is added to compensate. Studies suggest that
while incrementalism may be an occurrence in Congress, it may not be a simply yearly issue.
Several factors such as a change in the party in the Presidency, partisan changes in one or both
chambers of Congress, the presence of an election year, war, and many other events, all cause
departures from incremental budgeting (Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, & Aranson 2003). Some might
attribute incrementalism with institutional gridlock as a result of split government, however a
study shows that incrementalism is more prevalent in unified government than divided
government (Jones, True, & Baumgartner 1997). This is due to the ease of working out budget
deals, without the hassle of a divided government to criticize every detail of a proposed budget.
Breunig, Koski and Mortensen (2010) support this argument saying,
“The disproportionate information processing model suggests that policy makers
often ignore powerful signals for policy correction, which in turn leads to the type
of long-term policy stability that incrementalism characterizes. However, when
signals are particularly strong, policy makers tend to over adjust the current policies
leading to periodic, large-scale policy changes. This results in a distinct pattern of
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both stability and punctuated change in policy outputs often measured in terms of
public spending indices”.

In other words, when legislators ignore the signs that a change in policy is needed, and
continue to maintain their current policy trajectory, the characteristics of incrementalism are far
more prevalent. However, an overreaction to the same can lead to over compensation for their
lack of responsiveness. This can be a dangerous practice as too little of a response could lead to
an underfunded department, or a sudden realization that an increase in funding is needed may
lead to the opposite, and provide more funding than is needed, wasting the budget resources that
could have been better spent elsewhere.

Majority Party Control
This is not to say that partisanship is not one of the greatest determiners for political
decision making in the legislature, especially when it comes to budget decisions. The parties
have become more ideologically diverse over the years resulting in fewer legitimate
deliberations, less compromise, and a more mechanical exercise of legislation (Bafumi, 2012).
This means that with the growing gap between the ideology of the Republican and Democratic
parties, the greatest force in pushing legislation through is having the influence of a majority
party in Congress, and the House Ways and Means Committee. A majority party in Congress is
said to wield "influence" if it is able to help members meet their goals by shifting legislative
outcomes in the direction they prefer (Aldrich 2011). Though it may hold sway in the decisions
of individual legislators, Peter Hanson (2014) notes the majority party has a decisive, however
sometimes limited, ability to influence legislative outcomes in the appropriations process, and
must implore some form of manipulative processes, that the majority party may still meet certain
goals, but inevitably falls short in their ability to amass preferred policy. As William Minozzi
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and Craig Volden (2013) put it, majority party leaders must work to win over swing-voting
moderates. Despite being members of a given party, this does not always mean they stand side
by side on all issues making it difficult when a contentious bill comes up for voting. In fact it’s
quite rare to see such a unified event. Instead, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins (2005) argue
that the main role of the party in congressional voting, is the idea of harmonizing the party by
attempting to establish a vehicle for moderate legislators to use to get the votes needed to pass
proposed legislation. So while a majority control in Congress establishes a greater degree of
influence on legislation, by itself, majority control is still fairly limited and requires more
methods of influence in Congress to pass significant policy changes.

Veterans in Congress
It is important to understand the correlation between certain legislative motives and
partisan goals. Each party carries their own set of ideals, and political objectives, which is
reflected in their voting credentials. William Keech and Kyoungsan Pak (1989) examine the
relationship between legislative voting cycles and growth in veteran’s transferable payments, or
compensation pay. While their research found little evidence to support voting cycles as a cause
for veteran benefits increase, they were able to find a positive correlation between Republican
representation on the issue and nominal quarterly expenditures. The researchers control for
variables such as: price levels, unemployment rates, number of veterans, and party control of
Congress. Randall Holcombe (1999) elaborates more on the reasoning behind support for veteran
benefits legislation. He notes that veteran interest groups became a powerful voice and elaborates
that this is a direct result of the Civil War and the need for assistance in the war’s aftermath; as a
result the Republicans took up their call. He examines the growth of spending through each year
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and compares it to civilian and defense expenditures to note any difference in spending, while
controlling for war and post-war periods.
Veteran representation in the US Congress is an issue that may cause a systematic policy
bias when voting on foreign policy, national defense, and veteran benefits legislation. William
Bianco (2005) examines the differences in policy issues from the peak of veteran representation,
to the modern day lack of it. Bianco analyzes the influence of military experience on voting
decisions, and whether there is a correlation between veteran experience and partisan idealism.
While Holcombe and Bianco take a look into these specific areas, their research is somewhat
dated. As policy importance changes, a new large scale concern over the nation’s deficit could
lead to large decreases in all types of spending. The purpose of this paper, in part, will look to
build off Holcombe’s evaluation of Republican support, and whether it remains true and has
withstood the test of time, despite a push for large budget cuts in the current congressional and
presidential agenda. Unlike Bianco however, this paper will focus on veteran’s voting norms in
regards to veteran’s benefits spending, rather than other policy issues, in the same light used to a
determine partisan relationship with VA budget allocations.

Testing Correlations with Changes in the Department of Veterans Affairs Budget
Data has been collected on the Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA) budget from 1975
through 2016. The reasoning for starting at 1975 is the idea of the post reform doctrine, which
reflects the fact that Congress has changed dramatically since the reform upheavals of the 1970s,
after the Watergate scandal, which left many Americans mistrusting with the way the US
government had been operating and its lack of transparency. As a result of adapting to the "cutback politics" of the past decade, Congress now displays increased partisanship, tighter
legislation, and a new consolidation of leadership powers. (Davidson, 1992) The modeling uses a
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time series analysis, which analyzes data over time. This method will be utilized to best
understand changes in congressional spending on the VA. To test the theory regarding partisan
and veteran influences on budgeting for the VA, this study relies upon the compilation of
historical US budget data provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on its website.2
Budget allocation data is primarily provided by a Congressional Research Services (CRS) report
provided by the Federation of American Scientists on their website, up until 2008.3 The
remainder of the data, 2009 through 2016, is compiled on the VA’s official website.4 The
members of Congress were tallied each year for their partisanship, as well as any past military
experience. This included former active duty members, deployed or otherwise, members of the
National Guard, US Reserve, and all the branches of the US military. For each year, Congress
was broken down into a percent of Republicans in each chamber, and again as a whole across
Congress. The same method was used to break down veteran status in Congress for each year.
Furthermore, for each year, chambers were coded with a “1” if Republicans controlled the
majority of that chamber, and a “0” if not. The same method was applied to a majority control of
both chambers.
In this study, an analysis of the VAs budget allocation will be compared to the percent of
the total US budget of each calendar year. First, a line graph was developed to determine any
obvious correlations; such as an increase or decrease during certain historical events. Scatter
plots are then used to determine if there are linear relationships between VA Spending and GOP
control of Congress, as well as for the percent of veterans who serve in Congress, to test the
strength and relationship of the data. Once a linear relationship is established, a multivariate

2

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22897.pdf
4
https://www.va.gov/budget/products.asp
3
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regression model is developed and used to test alternative explanations for changes in VA
spending overtime to ensure there is no other outside influences on the data. This analysis
suggest the following hypotheses:
H1: There will be a positive relationship between the percent of GOP members in Congress and
VA budget spending.
As Holcombe (1999) pointed out, veterans may have been one of the first major interest
groups in the US, it stands to reason, especially given their issue ownership on the military and
veterans, as perceived by many American citizens, that Republicans would maintain a positive
relationship with one of their longest lasting constituencies. Furthermore, in regards to issue
ownership, Republicans have been more reflective of the public’s view on being the party more
beneficial to veterans, often passing favorable legislation and supporting many of the legislative
ideals that veterans hold; such as gun ownership and military spending. An increase in
Republican members in Congress should then lead to an increase in the VA’s annual budget, as a
percent of the total US budget.
H2: There will be a positive relationship between Republicans controlling both chambers of
Congress and VA budget spending.
Much in the same regard as the previous hypothesis, full control of both chambers would
allow Republicans to push for a greater degree of VA support with little resistance, as would be
supported by Aldrich’s idea of the influence of majority control (Aldrich, 2011). Since veterans
are generally seen as an important group by both parties, it’s conceivable that Democrats would
likely not oppose an increase in VA funding, especially while fighting in the minority over more
important pieces of legislature that don’t see any real bipartisan support. In addition, full control
of Congress may lead to the increased ease of passing legislation that conforms to their set of
legislative ideologies, thus increasing the odds of supporting members of their constituency.
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H3: There will be a positive relationship between veteran representation in the House and VA
budget spending.
Veterans inside Congress belong to a specific group of individuals that make up a notably
small section of the US population. With this in mind, it stands to reason that members of
Congress who identify as veterans are more likely to vote in favor of increased spending for their
fellow veterans. Bianco (2005) suggests that veterans vote along party lines, but does note a
correlation between veterans in Congress and defense spending, especially in the weapons
research and development section, however it’s not noted in his research whether that pertains to
veterans benefits as well. In regard to the House, this may be true on implementing increased
spending for the departments like the VA, as well as the Department of Defense. In addition, this
seems the mostly likely chamber for such an event to occur as the constitution clearly states the
role of the House. Article 1, section 7 states “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives...” This means that any request to increase the funding for departments
like the VA must come from the House. Assuming there is a greater number of veterans in the
House, it would seem likely that they would put forth a bill calling for a greater degree of
spending for the VA as it is not only the prerogative of the House, but possibly the sense of duty
among veterans in the House to support legislation that may assist other fellow veterans.
H4: There will be a null relationship between veteran representation in the Senate and VA
budget spending.
Unlike what is suggested in the previous hypothesis, Senate members are known to
curtail the spending of House proposals. The job of the Senate is to review bills put forth by the
House as elaborated in the same Constitutional article the expresses the responsibility of the
House, “…the Senate may propose or concur with [House revenue] amendments as on other
Bills.” In other words, the Senate has the right to accept the revenue increase as is, or propose a
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new budget amount in all. So while the House has the power to create the bills, it is the power of
the Senate to make the changes that they might see to be more beneficial. It is because of this
responsibility that the final hypothesis proposes a null relationship; veterans in the Senate will be
less affected by their status as veterans, and more influenced by their party role, as well as their
perceived responsibility in curtailing House budget proposals. As already addressed in the last
hypothesis, Biano’s (2005) theory of limited influence due to veteran status is expected to be
much stronger in the Senate, than in the House, with regard to their veteran status.

Brief Examination of the Budget Trend
It is important to understand any easily visible trends in the Department of Veteran’s
Affairs (VA) budget allocations. There may be certain givens that one would expect an increase
given certain events and situations. In examining Figure 1, one can infer some important pieces
of evidence about the budget trends for the VA. Between 1975 and 2016 the US has been
involved in several conflicts, most notably the end of the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War,
and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Examining Figure 1 shows some differences in the VA
budget allocation as a result of the war. The budget of the VA continued to grow through the
Vietnam War, however, directly following the end of the conflict the budget takes a sharp turn
downward. At the end of the Gulf War, only a very small increase is seen, and held, for a few
years before decreasing again. After during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts the budget seems
to rise exponentially. In the modern day US, veteran care has become a higher priority. This is to
be expected after a major conflict. The Gulf War was only a minor contest, and thus resulted in
less veterans needing more assistance. This is to be expected. A small war that only lasted six
month is unlikely to produce a large number a disabled veterans, and is also less likely to draw in
more volunteers to service in the war if quickly over. The war in Iraq and Afghanistan were
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much longer, and as a result of 9/11, brought in many more volunteers. When the conflict begins
to wind down however, more service members are likely to separate from the service putting
additionally strain on the VAs needs to keep up with a growing population of Veterans. It is
therefore probable that with a greater scale of conflict, and an increase in service members, the
budget for the VA would see in increase toward the end of the wars or conflicts being fought.
0.07
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0.02
0.01
0

Figure 1. Percent of the US Budget by Year

Increased Growth of GOP in Congress and Majority Control
The first relationship examined is the effects of partisanship on budget allocations for the
Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA), primarily the effect of Republicans in Congress, to
determine if they uphold the first two hypothesis and provide a benefit to the department. The
bivariate relationship between the percentage of Republicans in Congress and VA spending is
presented in Figure 2. Contrary to expectations there appears to be a negative linear relationship
between the percent of GOP members in Congress, and the percent of the budget allocated for
the VA. The effects of an increased percent of GOP in Congress have a negative correlation with
the percent of the total US budget earmarked for the VA. That is, the partisan effect of GOP
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growth in Congress on the funding for the VA, counters the assumption that Republicans are
willing to bypass their beliefs of a more limited national budget, in order to provide veterans
with a greater department in terms of spending on their needs through the VA. The same method
was applied individually for both chambers. Both also display a negative correlation, the Senate
to a greater degree than the House. This is to be expected as the Senate GOP members are
infamous for curtailing House budget plans. The interesting finding there is the negative
relationship associated with an increase of Republicans in the House. As stated in the
Constitution, it is the responsibility of the House to create increased appropriations bills. Despite
having the opportunity before the Senate can adjust the proposals, they don’t seem to utilize this
opportunity to attempt to pass greater spending proposals for the VA, and in fact seem to
decrease the total funding, as a percent of the budget, for the VA. This means that despite the
promise for better veteran aid, at least as far as providing funding for the VA goes, Republicans
are not maintaining their promise.
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Figure 2. The Size of the GOP in Congress and VA Budget Percent: 1975-2016
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Veterans in the House and Senate
The next relationship examined is the effects of veteran legislators inside Congress, and
whether that have an effect on VA budget allocations. We know members of a given group are
generally more likely to support the constituents of said group. An example being minority
legislators pushing for equal rights legislation, or business owners fighting for fairer business
regulations. In Figure 3 a positive correlation can be seen when there is an increase in veteran
representation inside the House. As expressed in the third hypothesis, this was to be expected
given the constitutional law stating, “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives...” Since veterans in the House can help to shape the proposed budget for the
VA, it would be logical that they would attempt to increase the earmark allocation for the VA.
However when run with just Senate members, the results show a negative relationship. When
combining the two chambers for a totally percent of veterans in Congress, the linear correlation
is almost perfectly flat. In other words, the positive effects of veterans in the House are negated
by the negative effects of veterans in the Senate. This supports Bianco’s (2005) claim that the
impact of veteran status on votes is generally small and has, at best, minor effect on legislative
outcomes because veterans are still members of their perspective parties and will vote the way
their party votes, leaving their status as veterans out of the decision making process. For those
veterans that follow the Republican Party, they are more likely to follow the ideology of fiscal
conservatism, and are less likely to push for larger amounts of spending, especially since the VA
is one of the highest funded departments in the US government, possibly leading them to feel
that an increased budget that doesn’t simply adjust for inflation or other standard variables, it not
a necessary stressor on the budget.
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Figure 3. The Size of Veterans in Congress and VA Budget Percent: 1975-2016

The Multivariate Results
The first variable examined in Table 1 presents the results of the analysis on GOP growth
in Congress, as a percent across both chambers. The findings in the table support the negative
linear findings seen in Figure 1. The table shows there is a strong relationship between a
decrease in VA funding and a larger percent of Republicans in Congress. The decrease in fairly
negligible, but it is still however present. The decrease that is seen is a .62 percent decrease in
funding, with a ten percent increase in the number of GOP members in Congress. Furthermore,
the decrease is only compounded when the GOP are in the majority in both chambers, seeing a
.90 percent decrease when this is the case. In other words, Republican ideology on limiting
federal spending to decrease the strain on the growing deficit, is predominant in their shaping of
the US budget, including for the department most closely linked to one of their longest lasting
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constituents. This also defies the expected outcome of the second hypothesis with both cases
yielding a negative correlation, rather than the expected positive correlation.
Table 1. Competing Explanations for VA Spending: 1975-2016
Predictor Variables
Lag of VA Spending
GOP in Congress (%)
GOP Majority (both chambers)
% Veterans in House
% Veterans in Senate

Expected Sign
+

% GOP in Congress
Coefficient (s.e.)
1.74e-16 (7.04e-17) *

GOP Control
Coefficient (s.e.)
1.77e-16 (7.04e-17) *

+
+

-.062 (.028) *

+
Null

.052 (.017) **
-.055 (.013) ***

.062 (.013) ***
-.060 (.012) ***

7.22 (1.57) ***
10.47 ***
.49
41

4.43 (.37) ***
13.92 ***
.56
41

Constant
F-Statistic
Adjusted R2
Sample Size
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05

-.905 (.026) ***

The outcome in Table 1 also tests the relationship between veterans in the House and
veterans in the Senate, testing to find a relationship with budgeting earmark allocations with an
increase in veteran representation in both chambers. Supporting the third hypothesis, the table
shows there is a positive relationship with an increase in veteran representation in the House,
both when there is an increase in GOP members, and when the same controls the majority of
both chambers. However, there is yet again another contradiction to the fourth hypothesis. While
it was expected that Senate members, even those with veteran status, would diminish House
budgeting proposals, the hypothesis proposed a null relationship that would see party loyalty
outweigh their position as veterans. Instead, the table finds that there is a negative relationship
with an increased number of veterans in the Senate. In fact, in both accounts, an increase in GOP
members and two chamber majority control, the Senate seems to be in perfect contradiction to
the positive effects see in veteran status in the House.
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Conclusion
Even though Republicans have been the party of veterans since the civil war, the results
of this analysis have pointed out that they have may have slightly deviated in their total effort to
support their veteran constituents. The effects of their rhetoric and political ideology, that of
limiting the federal budget to avoid greater deficit spending, seems to have taken the lead.
Though these finding contradict the hypotheses of this paper, it’s not a completely unexpected
result. The VA is one of the largest funded departments in the United States, and has a poor
reputation of efficiency to boot. This might explain why Republicans are reluctant to provide
more funding for the VA despite their veteran constituency. The negative implications with the
growth of the GOP in Congress toward VA funding has elaborated the stance of Republicans
conservative spending over their other obligation. Though the effect is minimal when there is an
increase in Congress, the effect remains. More so, the impact of controlling both chambers
creates an even bigger cut in VA allocations. The effects of majority control in Congress leads to
a more sizable decrease in the total percent of the annual US budget. Veterans on the other hand
had little impact. As stated earlier in this research, Bianco’s studies have found that veteran
status in Congress has little impact of legislative decisions, and this analysis seems to support
that. Though a positive effect is seen in the House, this may simply be due to the role the House
plays in budgeting rather than their status. This is more apparent in the Senate where their status
seems to be excluded from decision making in regards to the budget for the VA. In all the effects
of each seem to negate the other, again seeming to support the idea that veteran status in
Congress has little effect of their voting decisions, even when it’s in regard to their fellow
service members.
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It’s important to note that this analysis does not conclude that Republicans are not the
most suitable party for veterans. Supportive legislation, benefits, and investment in other
organization may still be higher for Republican legislators than their Democrat counterparts.
Further investigation and research into this topic should be conducted in the future in order to
make such claims. The results of this analysis does however point out the strength of the GOP’s
ideology in maintaining limited federal spending. As the budget nears a 20 trillion dollar debt
mark, Republicans push for harder for more restrictive federal budget spending to limit the
damage. Though both parties have failed to spend below the total budget since the Clinton
administration, it is the GOP that continues to advance fiscal conservative ideas when dealing
with the budget. The relationship with veterans in Congress also presents a fascinating finding.
Members of one of the proudest, and well respected groups in America, seem to leave this status
behind once elected into office and follow partisan ideology. Though veteran members in
Congress has greatly declined over time, they still remain well represented, being well over
double in the comparison to the veteran population as a whole in the US.
Going forward, in presenting new budget allocations for the VA, will be an intriguing
thing to watch as Congress attempts to deal with the problems in the VA. The VA has been
riddled with countless scandals over recent years, and as a result has seen a lot of scrutiny from
both the public and the politicians. Since 2014, the year the VA experienced one of their biggest
backlashes when over one hundred veterans were believed to have died due to massive wait
times to see a doctor, the reports by the VA on their patient visits, and average time a patient has
to wait for an appointment, was falsified by the VA. On top of that, poor practices have led to
unclaimed bodies in Chicago being left too long without a proper burial, or countless other
harassment charges filed against members of the VA over the years. However since 2014, the
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budget has continued to rise an additional 10 billion dollars. Even with that budget growth, the
VA has continued to have issues, and veterans are beginning to feel impatient as Congress
attempts to change the course of the VA and turn the department into one capable of handling the
needs of the growing number of veterans in the United States.
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